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Abstract 
Within criminological literature, there are growing references to a 'queer/ed 
criminology'. To date, ‘queer criminology’ remains a loose collection of studies and 
criminal-justice related commentary that uses the term 'queer'. Amid the growing 
calls for the more substantial development of these criminological studies, it is timely 
to reflect on the ways that the term ‘queer’ has been used in these discourses, to 
what ends, and with what effects. 
This paper considers the manner in which the term 'queer' has been used in these 
criminological and criminal justice discourses. It suggests that ‘queer’ has been used 
in two dominant ways: as an 'umbrella' term for lesbian, gay, bisexual, intersex, and 
queer-identified people; and to signify the use of theoretical tools with which to 
represent sexuality- and gender-diverse people more effectively within criminological 
research. The paper will argue that these ways of using ‘queer’ have a variety of 
implications and effects. Specifically, using ‘queer’ as an umbrella term has the 
potential to reinforce identity categories and the politics that surround identities (a 
critique that has often appeared in queer contexts), while using it as a theoretical tool 
potentially reproduces various investments in criminology and criminal justice 
institutions. Both uses may preclude other productive avenues for critique opened up 
by the term ‘queer’. 
The paper will conclude by suggesting that using ‘queer’ as a verb to signify a more 
deconstructive project directed towards criminology is a possible direction for these 
discussions. While this approach has its own effects, and articulates with existing 
deconstructive approaches in criminology, it is important to explore these 
possibilities at this point in the development of a ‘queer/ed criminology’ for two 
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reasons: it highlights that multiple, and often competing, ‘queer/ed criminologies’ 
exist; and it expands the diverse possibilities heralded by the notion of ‘queer’. 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘queer’ is being employed with greater frequency in research on particular 
criminal justice issues, as well as in broader theoretical reflections on how a 
‘queer/ed criminology’ might proceed (Tomsen 1997; Groombridge 1999; Woods 
forthcoming; Ball forthcoming). However, ‘queer’ is a contested term, and there are 
numerous debates as to what it refers, and how it can and should be used (Sullivan 
2003; Jagose 1996). 
‘Queer’ largely refers to an intellectual approach that seeks to deconstruct binaries 
such as homosexual/heterosexual or male/female and their institutionalisation in a 
variety of social sites (see Butler 1990; Sedgwick 1990). These studies developed 
out of numerous radical political movements focused on HIV activism, as well as 
those that sought to critique the assimilationist and often essentialising tendencies of 
many gay and lesbian political struggles. Queer theorists critique essentialist 
understandings of identity – particularly in the context of sexuality and gender – and 
prefer to explore the historical contingencies through which sexuality and gender are 
formed and regulated (see Foucault 1998; Sullivan 2003; Jagose 1996). 
However, a substantial amount of queer theoretical work takes the view that ‘queer’ 
denotes an attitude or a position, especially in relation to what is taken to be ‘normal’. 
As Sullivan (2003: 52) highlights, dictionary definitions of ‘queer’ often define it as ‘to 
quiz or ridicule, to spoil, to put out of order’. While many authors focus on 
deconstructing or ‘queering’ norms of sexuality and gender (Duggan 2001: 223; 
Smith in Sullivan 2003: 43) – an approach that, as will be discussed below, is also 
dominant in criminological discourses – others suggest that the constituency of 
‘queer’ is open-ended, and thus what connects those working in this area is their 
shared position vis-à-vis norms and normativity, not just sexuality and gender 
(Jagose 1996: 98; Sullivan 2003: 43; Giffney 2004: 73-74). 
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Thus, the primary strategy of many queer theorists is denaturalisation, and the 
confounding and unpacking of categories, pulling apart essences, oppositions, and 
foundational assumptions to understand how particular phenomena or questions 
about our social world have been constructed in the ways they have been (Jagose 
1996: 98; Sullivan 2003: 50-51). In this vein, David Halperin suggests that ‘queer’ 
‘...acquires its meaning from its oppositional relation to the norm. ‘Queer’ is by 
definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is 
nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers’ (Halperin 1995: 62, emphases in 
original). ‘Queer’ can therefore be a position in relation to the norm, rather than a 
positivity (Halperin 1995: 62). As such, for many theorists, ‘queer’ refers to more than 
simply deconstructing assumptions surrounding sexuality and gender, but extends to 
a wide variety of concepts.1 
Thus, it is clear that there is not one definition of ‘queer’, or that there is a shared 
understanding of what the proper object(s) of ‘queer’ might be. As these debates 
over what ‘queer’ refers to are unsettled and every citation of the term mobilises a 
particular understanding of ‘queer’, reproducing the specific effects that attend to that 
understanding along the way, this paper does not seek to pin down a definition of 
‘queer’. Rather, it explores the ways that the term ‘queer’ has been used in criminal 
justice discourses, and charts some of the implications of these different uses.2 It 
identifies two primary uses of the term ‘queer’ in criminal justice discourses: ‘queer’ 
as an umbrella term doing the work of an identity category (‘queer’ as noun); and 
‘queer’ as signifying a set of theoretical tools mobilised to effectively understand and 
represent sexuality and gender diversity in criminological research (what might be 
thought of here as ‘queer’ as ‘sensitising concept’). It then explores the implications 
of each of these different citations of the term and concludes by highlighting that one 
use of ‘queer’ that is largely overlooked in these discussions is its use as a verb, to 
signify a position or attitude. It suggests that there is scope in criminological 
discussions to further utilise such an understanding of ‘queer’. 
In offering this analysis, the paper does not seek to police the ways that the term 
‘queer’ is used in criminal justice discourses, nor to be prescriptive in its use, but 
rather to extend the range of debate about its use, and, as Judith Butler puts it, 
‘...make us consider at what expense and for what purposes [it is] used’ (Butler 
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1993: 229). Reflecting on, and articulating with greater precision, the understanding 
of ‘queer’ that is being mobilised must become a central part of any conversation 
about the use of the term in criminological and criminal justice discourses for two 
primary reasons: because it is apparent that there are multiple, and indeed 
competing, ‘queer/ed criminologies’ that ought not be confused; and it expands the 
diverse possibilities heralded by the notion of ‘queer’ and its use in criminology. This 
paper seeks to initiate a conversation on these issues. 
 
The Uses of ‘Queer’ 
‘Queer’ as Noun 
The term ‘queer’ has been employed in some criminal justice discourses as a noun – 
that is, to refer to an identity category or umbrella of identity categories under which 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer-identifying (LGBTIQ) people 
may be placed, or along the lines of which they might identify. Commonly, the term is 
used ‘almost simply’ (Sedgwick 2011: 200, emphasis in original) to refer to same-sex 
sexuality, but it is also used as a substitute for the unwieldy initialism of LGBTIQ 
(Duggan 2001: 224). 
‘Queer’ is used in this way in academic research such as Queering Conflict: 
Examining Lesbian and Gay Experiences of Homophobia in Northern Ireland 
(Duggan 2012), Queer (In)justice: The Criminalisation of LGBT People in the United 
States (Mogul et al. 2011), and Intimate Partner Violence in LGBTQ Lives (Ristock 
2011), to name a few. These works address criminological problems of relevance to 
LGBTIQ-identified people – whether this is a unique crime that is experienced by 
them (hate crimes, for example), a crime conventionally studied by criminologists but 
where these communities have been overlooked (such as intimate partner violence), 
or a particular (usually negative) experience of one aspect of the criminal justice 
system (such as the impacts of policing or prison). They comprehensively discuss 
the problems, forms of discrimination, inequalities, and experiences of LGBTIQ-
identified people in their interactions with the justice system. And this research is 
often geared towards addressing these injustices, and reforming the practices that 
are understood as problematic. 
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This particular use of ‘queer’ also appears in recent attempts to forge a ‘queer 
criminology’. Jordan Blair Woods, for instance, has suggested that ‘queer 
criminology’ would provide a space in which ‘LGBTQ people’ can represent 
themselves within criminological conversations, be recognised as part of these 
conversations, and ensure that accurate and appropriate understandings of 
themselves are furthered in this field. The desire of such a project appears to be to 
‘[reorient] the focus of criminological inquiry to give due consideration to the 
relationship between sexual orientation/gender identity and victimization, offending, 
and desistance from crime’ (Woods forthcoming). 
This use of ‘queer’ – as an umbrella identity category, or as a way of referring to a 
group of people – is productive. It allows for those with shared experiences by virtue 
of their existing outside of heteronormativity to be represented in research. It also 
allows researchers and others to bring criminological attention to bear on issues of 
injustice, or to important silences in these discourses, and open up a space for these 
injustices to be remedied, or these silences to be broken. 
 
‘Queer’ as ‘Sensitising Concept’ 
‘Queer’ has also been used in these discourses to signify the application of some 
theoretical perspectives or conclusions from queer theory in criminological analyses. 
The variety of research projects here have utilised queer theoretical insights about 
non-essentialised identities and the fluidity of sexualities and genders – the primary 
focus of many queer theoretical analyses – to understand the subjects of the 
research, while also exposing the troubling binaries that underpin criminological 
thought or exploring the heteronormative regulation of sexuality and how this 
intersects with crime and justice. 
For example, queer theoretical discussions about the government of sexuality 
through the norms embedded in various social sites have been used to explore the 
regulation and often criminalisation of those that live non-heteronormative or non-
cisgendered lives, particularly as this occurs through the law and aspects of the 
justice system (Dwyer 2012: 18; Mogul et al. 2011: 23; Narrain 2008: 51; Duggan 
1993: 75; Umphrey 1995: 26; Stychin 1995: 7; Moran et al. 1998; Robson 2011; 
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Dalton 2007; Dalton 2006; Mason 2001; Backus 2009; Tomsen 2006: 393-394). 
Other works look at how forms of surveillance regulate the ‘normal’ use of public 
space and govern public sex (Conrad 2009; see also Johnson and Dalton 2012). 
And still others look at the regulation of other forms of sexual activity or sexual 
visibilities (Dalton 2007; Dalton 2006; Mason 2001; Lamble 2009), explore how 
criminology might engage with these concerns, and how criminal justice might be 
better achieved. 
The queer theoretical analysis of essentialised identities has also been used to 
critique the understandings of victims and perpetrators (not to mention the binarised 
understandings of homosexual and heterosexual) that appear in knowledge about, 
and current approaches to address, hate crimes (Tomsen 2006: 394; Tomsen 2009: 
10-13, 15; Tomsen 1997: 39, 40, 42; Lamble 2008: 29). Additionally, these 
theoretical tools have been used to understand and represent gender- and sexuality-
diverse people in this context. For example, Chakraborti and Garland suggest that 
such work ‘...is important for developing a framework that can include some of those 
who are the victims of homophobic and transphobic violence... [because s]uch a 
framework challenges commonly-held societal assumptions about the demarcation 
of gender, sexual desire and identity’ (Chakraborti and Garland 2012: 75). In this 
approach, it is assumed that queer theory can be used to assist in understanding 
particular groups of people and their lived experiences, representing them effectively 
within research and policy. 
These ways of employing the term ‘queer’ – to signify a set of theoretical concepts 
that can be used in an analysis – are also apparent in some of the more explicit calls 
for the development of a ‘queer criminology’ that have been made since the mid-
1990s. In 1997, for example, Tomsen suggested that the critique of binary thinking 
that queer theory offers could be put to productive use in criminology, particularly in 
exploring the way criminology perpetuates the homo/hetero binary and maintains 
‘homophobic oppression’ – a task that he suggested was ‘...imperative in any 
sexually emancipatory politics’ (Tomsen, 1997: 34; see further Tomsen 2006; 
Tomsen 2009). Tomsen later developed this argument to suggest that such an 
approach would also include an ‘ongoing emphasis on the performativity of 
criminalised masculine identities and a progressive psychoanalytic stress on the 
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tense proximity of homo and hetero desire that feeds much male aggression, 
misogyny and risk taking’ (Tomsen 2006: 403). Groombridge also recommended 
queer criminology should follow Seidman’s suggestion that any analysis informed by 
queer theory ought to study the ways that ‘...knowledges and social practices... 
organise “society” as a whole by sexualising – heterosexualising and 
homosexualising – bodies, desires, acts, identities, social relations, knowledges, 
culture and social institutions’ (Seidman in Groombridge 1999: 533). 
While this paper can only begin to explore the way the term ‘queer’ has been 
employed in these discourses, it is apparent that one consistent feature of these 
uses is that they signify a mobilisation of the concepts of queer theory in ways that 
assume that these concepts offer accurate ways of understanding and representing 
gender- and sexuality-diverse people. Not only do these concepts allow researchers 
to appreciate the impact of heteronormative discourses and regulations in the field of 
criminal justice, but they offer researchers what might be considered ‘sensitising 
concepts’ in order to become attuned to the complexities of sexuality and gender 
diversity. In themselves, such analyses provide novel critiques of various criminal 
justice issues, and new directions for criminological discourses to follow. 
 
Implications of These Uses of ‘Queer’ 
As discussed, each of these ways of using the term ‘queer’ is productive. However, 
they also have a variety of potential impacts – they can lead to particular courses of 
action and ways of thinking, and preclude others. 
While the term ‘queer’ is often used productively as an umbrella term to signify a 
range of identities, this way of using the term has been critiqued as a ‘false but 
unifying umbrella’ (Giffney 2009: 2), producing the homogenisation of those that are 
considered to fit under it. It can erase very important differences along the lines of 
race, ethnicity, and class that exist between those that might be considered ‘queer’ 
(Anzaldúa in Sullivan 2003: 44). Additionally, this use of the term as, for all intents 
and purposes, an identity category, can lead to essentialised understandings about 
people, and, by extension, lead to problematic forms of identity politics (Giffney 
2009: 2; Anzaldúa in Sullivan 2003: 44; Sedgwick 2011: 200). 
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These questions about the political utility or strategic necessity of contingent identity 
categories is an ongoing (and perhaps unresolvable) issue in queer politics (see 
Gamson 1995; Butler 1993). A large part of queer theorising has developed as a 
response to and critique of essentialised understandings of sexuality, gender, and 
identity, with many people that identify as queer embracing this understanding 
(Jagose 1996: 77-78). Using ‘queer’ as an identity category in order to include these 
people in particular forms of research does allow for the production of knowledge 
about their experiences of a particular crime, but can effectively reintroduce 
essentialised understandings of identity into these discussions (Gamson 1995). This 
is partly because the deconstruction that attends many queer identities – and which 
is the basis for this stance against essentialism – is not carried further and directed 
towards other concepts in the research. Put simply, the people explored in the 
research are ‘queer’, but other aspects of the research are not (see further Ball and 
Scherer 2011: 1-2). This argument can be illustrated in the context of intimate 
partner violence. There is a growing body of research that charts the incidence of 
such violence in the lives of ‘queers’, and some of this work engages with queer 
theoretical insights insofar as they point out that our discourses about such violence 
are heteronormative, or that identities are not stable. However, in much of this 
research, the understanding of violence itself is not ‘queered’, and remains 
heteronormative or, indeed, homonormative (see Ball 2013; Holmes 2009).3 
A related point can be made about the ways that ‘queer’ is used to signify the 
mobilisation of queer theoretical concepts and tools to understand sexuality and 
gender diversity in these criminal justice discourses. These queer theoretical 
concepts and tools are used primarily to assist in the understanding of, and the 
appropriate representation of, gender- and sexuality-diverse people. However, this 
representation and understanding takes place within what remain largely 
conventional criminological analyses. Thus, while queer theoretical insights are used 
here to guide research in theoretically sophisticated ways and allow for a critical 
examination of the problematic assumptions that have long characterised the 
engagement with these issues within criminal justice discourses, the deconstructive 
critiques that queer theory can offer may be restricted. These queer theoretical tools 
are used to assist in understanding the subjects of research, and to appreciate the 
forms of regulation and normalisation that impact upon them, thereby contributing to 
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the development of knowledge about these people and their experiences, and to the 
development of more effective policies to address injustice. However, this 
deconstructive critique is not often turned towards criminology itself, its own project 
of producing such knowledge, and its attendant effects. 
To illustrate this, consider, for example, Chakraborti and Garland’s statement (2012: 
75) that in the context of hate crime, queer theoretical work ‘...is important for 
developing a framework that can include some of those who are the victims of 
homophobic and transphobic violence...’. Here, queer theory allows for a more 
effective representation of victims of hate crime, and is mobilised in projects that 
seek both criminological knowledge production about this crime, as well as the 
development of more effective responses to it. Groombridge’s suggestion that queer 
criminological work be situated ‘...squarely within mainstream criminological 
concerns, not on the criminological margins’ (Groombridge 1999: 543), and be 
directed towards producing explanations about criminal justice issues, are further 
possible examples of this kind of dynamic (Groombridge 1999: 539). 
Identifying the implications of these uses of ‘queer’ in criminal justice discourses is 
not intended to suggest that these are negative or undesirable uses of the term 
‘queer’. The incorporation of queer theory into criminological research can allow for 
the development of interventions that respond more effectively to the injustices that 
are the concern of many of these researchers, and the use of ‘queer’ as an umbrella 
identity category can allow for criminological attention to be turned towards important 
injustices. The critique offered here is intended only to point out that these uses of 
the term have a variety of implications, and these can place limits on the critique and 
deconstruction that is possible in criminal justice discourses. It is also to point out 
that other productive uses of the term ‘queer’ are possible, along which ‘queer/ed 
criminologies’ might proceed. 
 
Queer as a Verb? 
One possible way of using ‘queer’, discussed above, is as a verb – as signifying a 
position or an attitude. To say that this particular approach is not widely apparent in 
criminology is not to say that the work discussed above is not critical or 
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deconstructive. Rather, it is to argue that these analyses that use the term ‘queer’ 
often limit the deconstructive potential of ‘queer’ in some ways and thus still engage 
in what might be thought of as conventional criminological projects. This becomes 
apparent when one considers that regardless of whether ‘queer’ has been used as 
an identity category or as a set of ‘sensitising concepts’, it is continually connected to 
sexuality and gender, and these appear to remain the proper objects of these queer 
criminological analyses. So, criminological research most often mobilises ‘queer’ if 
the population of concern within the research are ‘queer’ people (experiencing hate 
crime or violence, for example), or if the focus is on the regulation of sexuality or 
gender identity, or if the particular activity explored has a sexual aspect to it (such as 
pornography, or sex work). Other aspects of the research are not ‘queered’, the 
attachment of ‘queer’ to gender and sexuality is not problematised (see Eng 2005: 
3), and the possibilities of ‘queering’ other concepts in the research more broadly are 
not fully developed (see the example of intimate partner violence above). 
By suggesting that the ways that ‘queer’ is used still engages to varying degress in 
conventional criminological projects merely suggests that many of them are still tied 
to forms of knowledge production, or to achieving criminal justice, and often still 
invested in criminal justice institutions. They help to provide a ground for knowing 
about a particular topic, and do not use ‘queer’ to signify a more thoroughly 
deconstructive project that could shift more fundamentally the ground upon which 
such criminology – or, indeed, criminologists themselves – stand. Such an approach 
might not just use queer insights to argue that criminology is heteronormative, but 
also use ‘queer’ as a position from which to highlight the costs of investing in 
criminology in the interests of ‘queers’. Using ‘queer’ as a verb within these 
discourses could help avoid these kinds of investment. 
Such a project would, of course, carry its own dangers, and certainly some are 
troubled by any move away from sexuality and gender within queer analyses (Halley 
and Parker 2011: 6). Using ‘queer’ as an impetus for deconstruction of this kind may 
push these criminal justice discourses in directions that criminologists may perceive 
as irrelevant, or outside the bounds of what is taken to be criminology. 
Deconstructive projects of this kind might also be perceived as being of little 
relevance to addressing immediate material injustices (for preliminary responses to 
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this critique, see Ball forthcoming; Cohen 1998: 117). And, of course, articulating 
whether this way of using ‘queer’ interacts with, replicates, draws from, challenges, 
reinvigorates, or indeed ‘queers’ existing deconstructive approaches in criminology 
must be explored (Cohen 1998). However, this approach is potentially a fruitful 
direction for criminologists, and is certainly one among many possible ‘queer/ed 
criminologies’. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has briefly explored the two dominant ways that the notion of ‘queer’ is 
utilised in criminal justice discourses, and pointed to some of the implications of 
these uses. It has highlighted that ‘queer’ is primarily used either to refer to an 
identity, or to signify a set of conceptual tools. It has also identified the implications of 
these different uses of the term, and suggested that an alternative conception of 
‘queer’ – where it signifies a disposition or attitude – could be productively utilised in 
this field. 
These discussions contribute to the development of a ‘queer/ed criminology’ – or 
what might more appropriately be termed ‘queer/ed criminologies’ – by encouraging 
authors engaging in such projects, or employing the term, to reflect on how they use 
the term, and the various implications of doing so. As each use of the term carries 
with it particular assumptions and can preclude other ways of thinking or acting, 
ultimately producing different kinds of criminological analyses, being attendant to the 
effects of their use of the term can allow for a more informed discussion about the 
possibilities of ‘queer/ed criminologies’, and the ways that ‘queer’ might be most 
effectively mobilised. 
The slipperiness of ‘queer’ highlighted in this paper is advantageous to criminal 
justice discourses, and not something that ought to be foreclosed. As Judith Butler 
points out, the term needs to ‘...be vanquished by those who are excluded by the 
term but who justifiably expect representation by it’, by those who use it in different 
ways, in order ‘...to let it take on meanings that cannot now be anticipated’, and also 
by those ‘...whose political vocabulary may well carry a very different set of 
investments’ (Butler 1993: 230). Perhaps the only thing that is certain among this 
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variety of ways of using ‘queer’ is that ‘[q]ueer, if it names anything, names a critical 
impulse that can never, must never, settle’ (Kemp 2009: 22). 
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1 Here, the deconstruction of queer theorists can become difficult to untangle conceptually from other 
forms of deconstruction. This is the focus of ongoing work, and queer criminological work that takes 
this direction needs to explore this point. 
2 Authorial sovereignty over the ways the term is used, or the effects produced, is not implied here. 
Instead, the focus is on the potential effects of these uses of the term, the assumptions implied in 
each of these uses, and the modes of thought they preclude. Further, while this paper primarily 
analyses academic criminal justice discourses, it does not exclusively consider those discourses. 
3 As the purpose of this paper is to highlight the ways that ‘queer’ has been used in criminal justice 
discourses, and to identify where it might be used differently, there is not space to fully consider the 
potential, and limits, of using ‘queer’ as a position here. This remains an important aspect of queer 
criminological work. 
